Logical Pluralism, Monism and Relativism

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v6i2.18883

Keywords:

logical monism, logical pluralism, logical relativism, paraconsistentization

Abstract

Is there only one logic? Or are there several equally adequate logics? What does it mean, after all, that different logics can be equally adequate? And they would be adequate with respect to what? This article intends to analyze the different answers to these questions, that is, we will evaluate the central arguments of the debate between pluralism, relativism and logical monism. We will explain, on the one hand, the main assumptions of this discussion and, on the other hand, its philosophical ramifications. We will end by indicating the development of a possible logical pluralism using the notion of paraconsistentization of logics, which will be explained afterward. We do not intend to refute, once and for all, logical monism. We will show that the main arguments put forward by a monist against logical pluralism are unsound and therefore the existence of some form of logical pluralism remains possible.

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Author Biography

  • Diogo Bispo Dias, University of São Paulo

    Possui graduação em Filosofia - Licenciatura Plena (2009) e Bacharel (2010) - pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, e mestrado em Filosofia pela mesma instituição (2013), financiado pela CAPES. Atualmente, é doutorando em Filosofia pela Universidade de São Paulo - USP, financiado pela CAPES, com a defesa da tese marcada para 24/01/2019. É membro dos grupos de Pesquisa CNPq Origens da filosofia contemporânea e Lógica Filosófica e Filosofia da Lógica. Tem experiência na área de Filosofia, com ênfase em Lógica, Filosofia da Lógica, Filosofia da Matemática, e Filosofia da Linguagem. Também atua nas áreas de origens da filosofia contemporânea, Círculo de Viena e epistemologia.

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Published

2018-12-28

How to Cite

Logical Pluralism, Monism and Relativism. Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, v. 6, n. 2, p. 21–36, 28 Dec.2018.