Enlarging the Conception of Science is to Build Bridges or Chasms? On the Philosophy of Science of Passeron
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v8i1.30425Keywords:
Passeron, epistemology of human sciences, historical sciences, PopperAbstract
Jean-Claude Passeron stresses that the rules of Popper’s normativism cannot be applied to social sciences, but only to natural sciences. For this reason, he suggests to enlarge the conception of science and rationality, so that it could also include social disciplines. However, from the perspective of a broader critique against Popper, this paper tries to show that natural and social sciences face common epistemic difficulties and solutions, thus, they should not be considered so distant. In addition, it intends to look to another possibility of approaching the question: accepting that there are many ways to describe the same reality. Perhaps the way to qualify social sciences as truly scientific is simpler than Passeron thought.
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