Enlarging the Conception of Science is to Build Bridges or Chasms? On the Philosophy of Science of Passeron

Authors

  • Juliana de Orione Arraes Fagundes Universidade Estadual do Sudoeste da Bahia, UESB

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v8i1.30425

Keywords:

Passeron, epistemology of human sciences, historical sciences, Popper

Abstract

Jean-Claude Passeron stresses that the rules of Popper’s normativism cannot be applied to social sciences, but only to natural sciences. For this reason, he suggests to enlarge the conception of science and rationality, so that it could also include social disciplines. However, from the perspective of a broader critique against Popper, this paper tries to show that natural and social sciences face common epistemic difficulties and solutions, thus, they should not be considered so distant. In addition, it intends to look to another possibility of approaching the question: accepting that there are many ways to describe the same reality. Perhaps the way to qualify social sciences as truly scientific is simpler than Passeron thought.

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Author Biography

  • Juliana de Orione Arraes Fagundes, Universidade Estadual do Sudoeste da Bahia, UESB

    Professora do Departamento de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da Universidade Estadual do Sudoeste da Bahia (DFCH/UESB). Doutora em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA). Possui mestrado, licenciatura e graduação em filosofia pela Universidade de Brasília (UnB). Membro do núcleo estruturante do GT de Filosofia da Mente da ANPOF. 

Published

2020-09-20

How to Cite

Enlarging the Conception of Science is to Build Bridges or Chasms? On the Philosophy of Science of Passeron. Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, v. 8, n. 1, p. 307–323, 20 Sep.2020.